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"Good fences make good neighbors."
Justice Antonin Scalia'
"Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out."
Justice Steven Breyer'
One of the most prominent issues in economic as well as political and legal
discussion today is "privatization," a term used generally to describe efforts to
transform traditional governmental functions into privately owned and operated
businesses. 3 While this debate has taken place under increasing scrutiny,
another type of privatization, one occurring within the nation's residential
communities, has been less studied. This has transpired even though it has been
causing dramatic changes in our society for nearly thirty years. This
transformation has helped to modify the character of our communities, alter the
dynamics of our political system, and challenge legal constitutional analyses at
both the federal and state levels.
Increasingly, state courts will have to confront this development because it
involves not only federal, but state and local concerns: local citizens fulfilling
their political role; state legislatures and state courts interpreting state
constitutions and statutes; and federal courts interpreting federal constitutional
provisions as well as state issues under diversity jurisdiction. This Article will
explore the phenomenon and dynamics of this movement, some of the social,
legal, and constitutional questions posed by these private communities and offer
three dominant legal approaches. This Article will pay special attention to state
courts interpreting state constitutions, a development once referred to as "the
1. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1463 (1995).
2. Id. at 1466 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE NEW
OXFORD BOOK OF AMERICAN VERSE 395-96 (Richard Ellmann ed., 1976)).
3. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
concerning the privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995);
JOHN DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS (1989); DAVID
OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT - How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS
TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992); Robert H. Nelson, The Privatization of Local
Government: From Zoning to RCAs, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 45 (Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989); Robert A. Rosenblatt, Ex-chief of Social Security Calls for
Privatizing Fund, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at A13. But see Agis Salpukas, The Rebellion in
Pole City, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at DI (discussing minor countertrend toward
municipalization of services).
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New Judicial Federalism," 4 but what today could more properly be
characterized as "The Third Century" of the State Courts in American law.
5
Sections I and II of this Article outline and discuss the background and
basic structure of these communities. Section III provides a framework for the
discussion of the legal issues involved, specifically the nature of the relationship
between cities and citizens, and the distinctions between what is considered
"private" or "public." Section IV covers the legal precedent in this area and
outlines three possible interpretations: a purely private contractual approach; a
public "state action" analysis; or a fact-based determination requiring the
application of a balancing test.
We then examine each of these approaches in terms of some existing
analogies, the company town and the shopping mall, in order to draw relevant
distinctions. These cases serve as a particularly valuable model because federal
precedent has undergone significant changes in modem times. Central to this
change is the development of the shopping mall in our society and its role as a
privately owned entity where large numbers of people may publicly congregate.
The Supreme Court originally equated the company town model with the
privately owned shopping mall; it then restricted the holding and finally
acknowledged the view that state courts could interpret their own state
constitutions more expansively than the federal Constitution in this arena.
Because of the potentially expanding role that state courts may play in this
developing area of the law, the final Section offers a closer look at some of the
current legal analysis of several states that have addressed this issue: a fact-
based determination that reaches competing conclusions; a state constitutional-
based determination; and a holding that applies the federal standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States was founded in part on the idea of a tension between the
prerogatives of the government (federal, state, and local) and the rights of
private individuals. Private markets, though, have always had an important
4. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreward: The New Judicial Federalism and Its Critics,
Symposium on State Constitutional Law, 64 WASH. L. REv. 5 (1989); Symposium on the Revolution
in State Constitution Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988); Smposium on State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391 (1988). • See also William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv'. 489 (1977); Alexander
Wohl, New Life For Old Liberties - The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: A State
Constitutional Law Case Study, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 177 (1990).
5. THE STATE COURTS IN AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY (B. Schwartz ed., 1976).
The title comes from California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk.
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effect on the public sector6 because of the belief that entire communities,
privately organized, created, built, and run, would function more profitably and
pleasantly than publicly organized and run cities and towns.7
From the few progressive and utopian communities of the late nineteenth
century, to the early suburbanite developments at the beginning of the twentieth
century, to the growing popularization of organized community development in
the middle of this century," experiments in urban planning and building private
communities have existed in some form, albeit generally as a small percentage
of cities or towns.9 Homeowner's associations, for instance, have a long
history in this country and abroad.' ° More recently, particularly in the last
thirty years, amidst the fear of spiralling crime and the dual developments of
urban decay and urban gentrification, Americans have turned increasingly to the
security and style of life offered by private communities, neighborhoods, and
living associations."
These communities have been classified variously over the years as "new
towns,"' 2  "new communities,"' 3  'edge cities,"" "condominium
6. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 7 (1994). See also Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An
Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 262-63 (1976).
7. This idea finds significant support in the Progressive movement and efforts to remove politics
from the management of cities. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1900-
1915 (1963); ROBERT H. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT (1962).
8. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 9; Marc A. Weiss & John W. Watts, Community Builders and
Community Associations: The Role of Real Estate Developers in Private Residential Governance,
in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL SYSTEM? 95, 97 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
9. Weiss & Watts, supra note 8, at 97.
10. Reichmn, supra note 6, at 257.
11. Timothy Egan, Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995,
at Al; Nelson, supra note 3, at 97-102. See also Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 16. Another movement, known as the "New
Urbanism," has concentrated on bringing affluent homeowners back to formerly abandoned and now
rebuilt inner city neighborhoods. These neighborhoods offer planned, pleasant, and diverse
communities that ensure that housing, jobs, and daily needs are within walking distance of each
other and mass transit. See PETER KATZ, THE NEW URBANISM - TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF
COMMUNITY (1994); Stefan Fatsis, Cities Remodel to Lure Upscale Buyers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
1995, at B10; Paved Paradise, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1995, at 42.
12. See, e.g., 'NEW TOWNS' WHY - AND FOR WHOM? (Harvey S. Perloff & Neil C. Sandberg
eds., 1973); Albert A. Foer, Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of Private Government, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 379 (1963).
13. See generally Foer, supra note 12.
14. JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY - LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991).
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associations,""5 "planned communities," 6 "common interest developments
(CIDs),"I 7 "planned unit developments (PUDs),"' 5 "cohousing, 9"' "gated
communities," 2' and "walled cities or communities." 2 Even though they may
have different legal structures, purposes, and types of residents, these
communities nonetheless share a number of underlying characteristics.
At their core, these associations provide a complete living package and the
simplicity and convenience that comes with private control or ownership. They
offer residents common emotional, psychological, social, and financial
advantages,' such as enhanced property values, long-term security,' and the
broader aesthetic goal of developing and maintaining open space with clean,
attractive living areas.'
On a more elementary level, these associations help assure residents that
basic local needs and community services such as sewage, garbage, plumbing,
and road care are fulfilled.' Established rules regarding the use of common
15. Brian L. Weakland, Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow,
13 PEPP. L. REV. 297 (1986).
16. McKENZIE, supra note 6, at 3.
17. See Carol J. Barton & Stephen E. Silverman, The Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners
Associations, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERoOVERNMENTALSYSTEM? 31,32 (Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelationsed.,
1989); Dennis R. Judd, The Rise of the New Walled Cities, in SPATIAL PRACTICES 144, 155 (Helen
Liggett & David C. Perry eds., 1995).
18. RESIDENTIALCOMMUNITY A&OCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL SYSTEM? 9 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989) [hereinafter
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS].
19. Stefan Fatsis, 'Cohousing'Mixes 60's Ideals, 90's Realities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1996,
at B8.
20. Egan, supra note 11, at 22.
21. Judd, supra note 17, at 144.
22. See A. Dan Tarlock, Residential Community Associations and Land Use Controls, in
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SYSTEM? 75 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ed., 1989).
23. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 47; Weiss & Watts, supra note 8, at 96-97 (citing the example
of the Levittown developments of the late 1940s as not only mass-produced affordable housing, but
"an attractive investment for young families precisely because of the planning, construction, and
long-term maintenance of a complete community."); MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 128-29; see also
Richard Briffault, Our Localism HI-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV'. 346, 372
(1990).
24. Weiss & Watts, supra note 8, at 95.
25. Id. The association provides to its members essential services such as garbage collection
and security through its work as "a vehicle for individual unit owners to work together" and its
function "as a quasi-governmental entity." Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of
Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations,
12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 917-18 (1976). These qualities are not necessarily restricted to
private communities. One landmark work observed in detail an individual anonymous town, culling
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areas, as well as restrictions on what the residents are allowed to display or
include in their individual homes,' provide conformity that many find
comforting, particularly in terms of the legal "mechanism [to] effectively
enforc[e] and adapt[] [these] deed restrictions over the long term."'27
But perhaps the most important reason for the dramatic growth of these
planned and protected communities today are the controls and barriers that these
communities can offer their residents: an answer to the growing sense of
vulnerability and insecurity that many increasingly feel.' These associations,
as one commentator noted, are comparable to the "walled cities of the medieval
world, constructed to keep the hordes at bay.'
It is no surprise then, that millions of Americans have in recent years been
attracted to this style of living. One recent report indicates that about twenty-
eight million people, or over one tenth of our population, now live in private
community associations.' This number includes both condominiums and
cooperatives and is expected to double within ten years.3" Another study
suggests that in 1992 there were as many as 150,000 homeowner associations
privately governing an estimated thirty-two million Americans.32 By the next
century, these common interest developments in one form or another may
become the primary organization of new home ownership in most metropolitan
areas.
33
specific observations about its residents, work habits, family lives, governmental activities,
education, religion, and general community interaction, and found many of the same qualities that
residents of private communities today seek. See generally ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL
LYND, MIDDLETOWN (1956).
26. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 25, at 918-19.
27. Weiss & Watts, supra note 8, at 95.
28. See Egan, supra note 11, at Al; Reich, supra note 11, at 16.
29. Judd, supra note 17, at 160. One observer has criticized these developments as
"communalistic, even cultlike," developments that "often emphasize security measures to a chilling
degree." MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 141. The author cited one study which noted that 92 percent
of the home buyers in a private senior citizens community rated security as "very important," and
described the development as one "surrounded by 'six-foot block walls topped with two-foot-high
bands of barbed wire,'" and "more than three hundred private security officers patrol[ling] the
grounds." Id.
30. See Egan, supra note 11, at Al (citing a Community Associations Institute study). The
article distinguishes between this number and the smaller total of four million individuals who live
in "closed-off, gated communities." Id.
31. Id.
32. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 11. The number of homeowner associations has also risen
dramatically, from fewer than 500 in 1964; to 10,000 in 1970; to 20,000 in 1975; to 55,000 in
1980; and 130,000 in 1990. Id.
33. Judd, supra note 17, at 155.
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This dramatic change in the dynamics of community living presents the
possibility not only of physically reshaping neighborhoods and towns, but also
restructuring systems of community and interpersonal interaction, legal rights,
and personal responsibilities. At best, these communities may seem like idyllic
living locales, which serve to "enhanc[e] the sense of neighborhood identity and
community."' These efforts to achieve utopia, however, may also support
communities which spur the development of an "us versus them" mentality-
keeping distance (and walls) between those who are perceived as either
economically, socially, or racially different."
The purpose of this Article is not to address the voluminous history of
intra-community conflicts:' the legal battles based on the frequent regulations
that govern the residents of the communities, which themselves have generated
significant legislation37 and litigation among members of the communities
34. Nelson, supra note 3, at 50.
35. See Egan, supra note 11, at Al. See also MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that this
privatization "carries with it the possibility that those affluent enough to live in CIDs will become
increasingly segregated from the rest of society."); Judd, supra note 17, at 155 ("[it is clear that
CIDs [common interest developments] did become the means of continuing the housing industry's
and the federal government's decades-old policies that segregated residential areas by income, social
class, and race."); Reich, supra note 11 (discussing the secession from society of the "fortunate
fifth"); Malcom Gladwell, Symbol of Suburban Death, WASH. PosT, Feb. 6, 1996, at Al (discussing
the case of a suburban New York mall that banned public bus service "from the inner-city, minority
neighborhoods of nearby Buffalo" until a protest following the death of a young woman who was
killed after being forced to cross a street outside mall property). But see David J. Kennedy, Note,
Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on
Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 767 n.34 (1995) (explaining "that even poor minority
communities may have residential associations" in order to have protections from crime).
36. See, e.g., N.R, Kleinfield, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has Steep Ups and Downs, N.Y.
TimS, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al (describing a number of regulations for co-op residents, including
"poorly dressed guests must ride service elevator," "residents cannot sit in lobby chairs when
dressed in flippers," and "no wok cooking," each of which can lead to intra-co-op disputes.)
37. See Tarlock, supra note 22, at 75-76 ("As internal conflicts have become more widespread,
state legislatures have intervened in the name of consumer protections. State legislation governs
issues such as RCA [Residential Community Association] and member tort liability, association self-
dealing, and the required disclosure of the RCA structure and powers."). See also Judd, supra note
17, at 158.
Residents' associations have a tendency toward autocratic rule making, all the more so
because they are not required to observe rights of self-expression, free association, and
free speech. . . . One study of 600 home owners associations found that more than
44% of the boards had been threatened with lawsuits in a year's time.
Id.
38. See, e.g., Weakland, supra note 15, at 301, 310-26 (noting the case of the "litigation-
plagued" status of the Village Green condominium project in Los Angeles and discussing a number
of intra-developmentcases involving constitutional analysis); Judd, supra note 17, at 158 (discussing
the frequent legal battles on issues including "the mounting of a basketball hoop, the picking up of
dog droppings, untrimmed bushes blocking ocean views, for-sale notices, and flying of the American
flag.") (citations omitted). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130
Rishikof and Wohl: Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State Will Make t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
516 VALPARAISO UNIVERS1TY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
and the boards. Instead, this Article explores the relations of these bodies to the
essential rights of citizens who live beyond the boundaries of these communities
and have neither consented to their rules, nor received their benefits.39 It does
so through an examination of the current state of constitutional analyses in this
field, in both the federal sphere and the more fluid arena of state jurisprudence.
It also places this analysis within the context of some of the relevant current
legal, sociological, and economic research that has been conducted in this area.
To date, the number of documented infringements of rights of non-resident
citizens are minimal. Potential questions include: the right of non-residents to
travel the roads freely;' the extent of constitutional protections for criminal
suspects as a result of communities' private police forces that may stop, search,
or simply detain individuals who are perceived as threatening to the private
community;4 the conflict between the rights of listeners versus protesters; 42
and even the potential impairment to the right of exercise of religious freedom
in situations in which a place of historical religious significance is affected by
the actions of a private development or developer.43
U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1526-63 (1982); Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 25; Note, The Rule of Law in
Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REv. 472 (1985).
39. See Katharine Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to
Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2-6
(1984).
40. See, e.g., Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Assoc., 28 Cal. Rptr.
2d 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (denying city the power to limit public access to streets in private
communities, arguing that the public has a fundamental right to access to streets regardless of their
location).
41. See WAYNE R. LEFAvE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 151-53 (1984)
(discussing the exclusionary rule and "private" searches).
42. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding city ordinance banning picketing
"before or about" any residence but rejecting the suggestion that the streets, simply because of their
residential character, are not a public forum); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that a
Washington D.C. statute prohibiting picketing in front of embassies violated the First Amendment
because it was a content-based restriction); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (holding
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an Illinois statute
prohibiting picketing of residences or dwellings but exempting peaceful picketing of a place of
employment involved in a labor dispute).
43. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding
that government was not prevented from building a roadway on government owned lands even when
that roadway passes through areas deemed by Native Americans to be sacred religious sites);
Christopher Kincade, Indians Seek to Acquire Dobbs Ferry Dig Site, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1995,
at C21. But see United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that federal law
criminalizing the taking of Indian relics from ancient burial sites applies to private as well as
government property); West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio 1969) (striking
down covenants as unenforceable under the doctrine that judicial enforcement of covenant constitutes
state action).
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II. THE STRucruRE OF PRIVATE COMMUNITIES
Although any list of how private living arrangements are codified
demonstrates the broad variety of specific classifications, most of the
arrangements can be categorized broadly under the technical term of Residential
Community Associations (RCAs), mandatory membership organizations that
usually involve one of three types of residential ownership: condominiums,
homeowners' associations, and cooperatives." An important distinction in
terms of community dynamics also exists between the single building association
and the territorial association, which involves more than one building on a site
and can include "common open spaces, recreational facilities, streets, and
facilities for other services provided by the association.'
In a condominium association, the resident, in addition to owning his own
living space, is a common owner, in common interest, of all other areas in the
association territory, not including the individual units.' In this situation, the
RCA owns no property but is responsible for the maintenance and regulation of
the common areas, which often include common hallways, parking lots, garages,
lobbies, and even the exteriors of buildings.47 The condominium form of
ownership is "a creature of state statutes," and associations are generally
afforded expansive powers.'
A member in a homeowners' association owns an entire individual home
and the lot on which it sits.49 The RCA is responsible for the management of
common properties of the neighborhood such as roads, open areas, and
recreational facilities.' However, unlike the condominium arrangement, it is
the homeowners' association, not the residents collectively, that owns the
common areas and the association itself is subject to taxation on the property."'
In a cooperative residential association, members do not own actual
property, but buy into a corporation that manages all buildings, facilities, and
common properties.52 Cooperatives are less common and comprise only about
one to two percent of all RCAs.53
44. RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id.
48. Weakland, supra note 15, at 299.
49. RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 10.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 4, 11.
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The legal and contractual power that developers use to realize their vision
of a community, as well as to ensure continued maintenance of that vision, is
through conditions, covenants and restrictions ("CC&Rs"), agreements between
the individual buyers and sellers of the lots.' Written by developers and
normally subject only to modification by a super-majority of all members, the
CC&Rs are in essence permanent5 and offer developers a great deal of power
to create a lifestyle within a development. They also confer upon the association
the ability to impose behavioral standards on visitors of the residents as well as
the residents themselves.'
Through the establishment of an RCA and its board of directors, developers
are also able to assure prospective home buyers that an entity will vigorously
enforce the CC&Rs after all of the property has been sold or leased and the
developer has moved on. The directors are typically elected from unit owners
whose votes are apportioned on the basis of property holding.57 Typical
CC&Rs provide that the board of directors has the authority to make rules and
to establish penalties for violations.'
The development of the RCA also has a foundation in consumer protection
law, since it helps to ensure that there will be a commitment on the part of
planned communities to create open spaces, as well as recreational and other
facilities that guarantee quality of life as well as increased investment value. 9
Additionally, because these new facilities, which may include parks, roads,
ponds, or swimming pools, may not be under the control of the local or city
government, public standards of construction do not necessarily have to be met.
The RCA can fulfill the role of inspector of these facilities, a particularly
important function in today's world of frequent litigation for tortious injuries.'
Beyond their regulatory and administrative functions, RCAs allow
developers to offer a multitude of services that historically were the
54. Weiss & Watts, supra note 8, at 97; MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 127-28 (noting that these
regulations give a developer "the power to create a distinct lifestyle in a development, which the
developer can use as a powerful marketing tool.").
55. MCKENzIE, supra note 6, at 127.
56. Id. at 129.
57. Weiss & Watts, supra note 8, at 96. Most RCAs are governed by a board of directors
elected from the unit owners whose votes are apportioned on the basis ol property holding. In
homeowners' associations, each unit or lot usually has one vote regardless of the number of residents
in the unit. In condominium associations, votes are often apportioned on the basis of the size of the
individual unit, with larger units receiving greater weight. Id.
58. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 25, at 919. The association usually enforces these rules
through fines and uses a relatively informal judicial process. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 129.
59. RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 9-10.
60. rd.
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responsibility of municipal governments. These commonly include utility
services, street maintenance, lighting, and trash removal. RCAs also allow
developers to offer extra amenities, such as tennis courts and clubhouses.
Perhaps most importantly, the RCA is the vehicle through which the developer
can maintain such services and facilities after the subdivision is completed, an
example of the long-lasting nature of the regulations of the association, the
modem equivalent of a covenant that runs with the land.6
Upon purchase, the new homeowner's consent to the covenants and other
regulations contained in the CC&Rs, as well as the reasonable exercise of the
association's enforcement powers, is implied.62 Though covenants have their
basis in the pre-constitutional property restrictions of equitable servitude,' over
the years the Supreme Court and individual state courts have interpreted and set
some constitutional limits for some covenants by these "private" associations.
The leading precedent in this field is Shelley v. Kraemer,6 in which the
Supreme Court refused to enforce a racially restrictive covenant on a piece of
private property that was for sale. The Court held that even though the
transaction was between two private parties, state action existed because a court
was asked to enforce the deed restriction.' The holding of Shelley, as it
relates to the relationship between state action and the constitutionality of
restrictive covenants, has been followed and expanded at both the federal and
state level,' but some courts have demonstrated that there are clear limits to
this analysis.67 Not surprisingly, Shelley and its progeny continue to generate
61. Id.
62. Weakland, supra note 15, at 299-300.
63. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 147-48; Reichman, supra note 6, at 279-80.
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
65. Id. at 20. The covenant stated in pertinent part:
mhe said property is hereby restricted to the use and occupancy for the
term of Fifty (50) years from this date . . . that hereafter no part of said
property or any portion thereof shall be ... occupied by any person not of
the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said
property for said period of time against the occupancy as owners or tenants
of any portion of said property for resident or other purpose by people of
the Negro or Mongolian race.
Id. at 4-5.
66. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (following Shelley and holding that
petitioners' request of a state court for sanctions against party who breached covenant constituted
state action); West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969) (applying
Shelley to religious issues).
67. See Franklin v. Spadafora, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a development's
condominium bylaw amendment limiting the number of deeds each individual could possess did not
violate any rights of due process and equal protection because the bylaw did not impinge on any
fundamental rights and hence did not require state action); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (lex.
1971) (rejecting plaintiff's request that it strike down defendants' restrictive covenant limiting the
residents to single family housing on the basis that it undermined current federal legislation
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significant conflicting legal analysis.6
III. A FRAMEwoRK FOR ANALYSIS
It seems appropriate, when examining a creature of the modem state such
as private communities, to scrutinize precisely what we mean by the term
"community." One authoritative source includes in its definition the following:
"a body of individuals organized into a unit or manifesting usually with
awareness some unifying trait" and "the people living in a particular place or
region and usually linked by common interest."
It seems clear, and not particularly surprising in light of the nature of these
communities, that whatever the definitional source, the terminology invariably
will include words and concepts such as "interaction," "association," and
"shared experience." The idea of interaction in our work and our living
environments has been essential to human development. Residential gatherings
traditionally have been "free-flowing networks of human relationships centered
in home and family."" Throughout history, societies have thrived on
promoting de-institutionalization of the disabled and dismissing argument that disabled individuals
merited special consideration, therefore eliminating issue of state action). In Welsh v. Goswick, 181
Cal. Rptr. 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), a California appellate court did not reach the constitutional
issue concerning whether the operation of a nursing home for six elderly people violated a planned
development covenant requiring property be used for "single family residential purposes only." Id.
at 705. But in a concurring opinion, one justice, citing Shelley, concluded that the covenant violated
the residents' right to privacy under the California Constitution. Id. at 710. (Staniforth, J.,
concurring).
68. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and Private
Worlds, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 709, 710-12 (1989); Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional
Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 787 (1989); Clyde W. Summers, Commentary, 67 WASH. U.
L.Q. 799 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and 7heories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. ScH.
L. REv. 383 (1988).
69. WaasTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1986). See also Reich, supra
note 11, at 6 (discussing the "idea of community" and its special attraction for Americans). The
notion that a community could serve as the archetype for civil society has roots in Puritan thought.
In the New World, the Puritans did not merely wish to settle, they wanted to root in its soil their
vision of a holy commonwealth. See DAVID HAWKE, THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 132-54 (1966).
Professor Hawke points to the leader of the Massachusetts' Bay Company, John Winthrop, who
stated his vision of "a city upon a hill," where "the eyes of all people are upon us." Id. at 133.
Dissenters to the dogmatic tenets of Puritanism were similarly inclined to see the community
not simply as a place of dwelling, but as part of a grand experiment. Id. at 142. To leave the fold
of the Bay Company and to create a new settlement was a political statement. Id. Towns became
worlds unto themselves, which created an ad hoc, decentralized pattern of governance. Id. at 149.
Prominent Puritan dissenter Thomas Hooker, who created Cambridge, Massachusetts as a response
to the arbitrary system of government instituted by the colonies' leaders, had a vision of a
commonwealth founded in "the free consent of the people (who) set the bounds and limitations of
... power." Id. at 148-50.
70. Judd, supra note 17, at 145.
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unhindered association, voluntary interchange, and the strength of public
marketplaces and gathering points that bring communities together to talk,
barter, and trade.'
The United States, in particular, has a "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open,"' and that our streets and other public areas are equally sacrosanct
from government proscription. Justice Owen Roberts once noted: "[wihere
ever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and . . . have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."" Today's private communities and the rules they operate under
may challenge this traditional commitment to individual rights and open space
embedded in our legal tradition.74 While those who become part of these
communities do so willingly,75 there are many who live outside of these
communities who have not, either contractually or otherwise, agreed to these
restrictions, yet may have their rights impaired. An equally important impact
of these private communities is the reduction and gradual elimination of
traditional public areas of uninhibited exchange. "[O]ur current society has
become so adept at creating and fetishizing those things which are private," at
the expense of "the public realm ... that shared space in society which brings
people to gather together, to relate to one another, and/or to be separate."76
This movement away from traditional, dynamic city structures and
gathering places involving shared streets and common areas has not gone
entirely unnoticed or uncriticized." Critics include not only lawyers and policy
makers, but also city designers and architects. Their view is based on both the
71. See id. at 144-45.
72. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
73. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (striking down restriction on occupancy of a homeowners' association under state action
doctrine because agents of the state facilitated the restrictions); Franklin v. Spadafora, 447 N.E.2d
1244 (Mass. 1983) (upholding on non-constitutional grounds a condominium bylaw restricting the
number of units a single individual could own).
75. See Ellickson, supra note 38, at 1526-30.
76. Elizabeth Moule & Stefanos Polyzoides, The Street, the Block and the Building, in THE
NEW URBANISM - TOWARD AN ARCHITEcruRE OF COMMUNITY at xxi (Peter Katz ed., 1994). As
another critic suggested, we run the grave risk of creating a segment of our population that is little
more than a "privatopia, in which the dominant ideology is privatism; where contract law is the
supreme authority; where property rights and property values are the focus of community life; and
where homogeneity, exclusiveness, and exclusion are the foundation of social organization."
MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 177.
77. See, e.g., STREETS, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC SPACE 5-6 (Zeynep Celik & Diane
Favro eds., 1994); Jerry Adler, Bye Bye Suburban Dream, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1995, at 40.
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aesthetic and the practical:
Our basic public space, the street, is given over to the car and its
accommodation, while our private world becomes more and more
isolated behind garage doors and walled compounds. Our public space
lacks identity and is largely anonymous, while our private space
strains toward a narcissistic autonomy. Our communities are zoned
black and white, private or public, my space or nobody's.'
The privatization of our world is even beginning to reach into our daily
interpersonal communications. With the onset of the modem information age
and the rapidly expanding use of technologies such as the internet, the number
of individuals who operate from the privacy of their computer terminals behind
the walls of their offices or in their homes secreted behind the walls of their
private communities is growing."
This conflict between public and private power is at the heart of "state
action analysis," but it also plays an important and related role in the legal
inquiry in several other areas of the law. In contract law, for instance, there is
the principle of third party beneficiary: the idea that a party not privy to a
contractual agreement, including city governments, can be the beneficiary of that
agreement and have a source of protection in that interest.' This concept may
have direct implications for private residential communities, particularly as it
relates to conflicts over beachfront access between titleholders to land abutting
the coast and the public, who traditionally have enjoyed the recreational value
78. PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METRoPous 23 (1993). Another commentator
offered the following description of the development of private communities:
In the suburbs of Los Angeles, the urban future can already be read into the
landscape; vast, sprawling clusters of gated communities are connected to
one another and to fortress buildings, enclosed malls, and sports stadiums
by a web of freeways and interchanges. Urban dwellers learn to negotiate
the labyrinth of walls like rats in a maze.
Judd, supra note 17, at 162.
79. See Robert Cervero, Why Go Anywhere?, Sci. AM., Sept. 1995, at 118. (discussing self-
contained towns built without the need for vehicles and due in part to advances in
telecommunications); Don Lee, Home Court Advantage-More Female Lawyers in O. C. Go Part
Time By Telecommuting, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at Dl; Timothy L. O'Brien, The Home War:
On-Line Banking Has Bankers Fretting PCs May Replace Branches, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995,
at Al (discussing increasing use of computer banking from home); Bart Ziegler, On-Line Shops-
Lots to See, Little to Bay, WA..L ST. J., Dec. 20, 1995, at B1 (describing increasing use of internet
shopping).
80. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990). See United States v. Capps, 348 U.S.
296 (1955); United States v. United Serv. Auto. Assoc., 431 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1970); Town of
Moriah v. Cole-Layer-Trumble Co., 606 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Town of Islip v.
S. Zara & Sons Contracting, 615 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Town of Babylon v. Lizza
Indus., 593 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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of the shore. Similarly, legal questions involving the Takings Clause,
easements, and property reserved for the public trust have implications for the
relationship between private property and the rights and interests of public
citizens."' At the very least, changes in our social and community structure
such as the increasing privatization of our communities call upon us to begin to
address the underlying concept of cities and communities and their relationships
to the individuals within them.
A. Cities and Citizens
One of the dynamics built into the unique federalist structure of our nation
is the tension among national power, state power, city jurisdiction, and the
individual. This is particularly true for city residents, who are under the
authority of each of these governmental entities. How residents cope with and
adapt to these pressures, and how local autonomy and the development of
private associations or governments contribute to this adjustment is the source
of much debate and several schools of thought, including "private contract,"
"public-spirited," and "pragmatic".
Some theorists believe that constitutional and statutory law applied to cities
works to protect the rights of individual citizens from the heavy hand of the
local government and to limit the power of cities.' At the same time, these
state-created and state-empowered domains can be especially responsive to the
concerns of local residents, helping them to represent and defend the values of
home and family," and offering individuals the opportunity to control their
own lives."
A general theory of increased local autonomy and political participation in
local government, framed in terms -of the benefits to the individual citizen,"
81. The Takings Clause states in pertinent part: "No person . . . shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d
168 (Me. 1989) (holding that publicly mandated easement for fishing, fowling, and navigation did
not include public recreational use and was a regulatory taking).
82. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062-67
(1980).
83. See Briffault, supra note 23, at 382, 389. Professor Briffault cites the Supreme Court's
decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), as evidence of the interpretation
of the local government as "an extension of the home, not an arm of the state, a defender of the
family rather than an oppressor of individual liberty." Id. at 383.
84. See GERALD E. FRUG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 538 (2d ed. 1994).
85. Frug, supra note 82, at 1067-70. Professor Frug lists Hannah Arendt's concept of "'public
freedom'-the ability to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect one's life" as
an important part of any local society. Id.
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has its basis in the traditional democratic Greek city-state. 6 At the core of this
ethos is the understanding that responsible local decision-making requires small
communities in which individuals are knowledgeable of, involved in, and
committed to the issues about which they are making decisions." It is this
theory upon which local private communities, acting as private governments and
standing as a private alternative to the city, are in part founded, created as a
vehicle for shared responsibilities, decentralized power, a common good, the
reinforced sense of community, and a defense against the crises facing our
society today.88 "Like a city, an association enables households that have
clustered their activities in a territorially defined area to enforce rules of
conduct, to provide 'public goods' (such as open space), and to pursue other
common goals they could not achieve without some form of potentially coercive
central authority."'89
Certainly, Alexis de Toqueville would appreciate this approach. Although
few discussions of American government or community structure occur today
without at least symbolic reference to Toqueville's monumental work Democracy
in America,' this reference and application is particularly compelling when
discussing private communities and associations. One of Toqueville's central
themes concerns the principle of association, and his belief that nowhere else in
the world has it "been more successfully used, or more unsparingly applied to
a multitude of different objects, than in America.""' Among the powers
identified by Toqueville in the association were those uniting electoral bodies,
"constitut[ing] a separate nation in the midst of the nation, a government within
the Government."'
But there is no consensus of opinion that local cohesion or participation
helps transform local governments into beneficial utopias, nor is there
unequivocal evidence of a significant connection between the size of government
and increased participation of the populace." In fact, critics suggest quite the
opposite, "the vision of common-unit developments as laboratories of small-scale
86. See Briffault, supra note 23, at 395.
87. See Frg, supra note 82, at 1069. See also Briffault, supra note 23, at 396 (discussing
other political science and economic theories on the relation of size to political participation).
88. See Ellickson, supra note 38, at 1519-20.
89. Id.
90. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Reeve Translation 1900). For an
example of the use of this powerful work, see Nelson, supra note 3, at 47.
91. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 90, at 191.
92. Id. at 192-93. See also Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995),
in which the author suggests that community involvement helps strengthen democracy by
encouraging people to talk to one another.
93. Briffault, supra note 23, at 401-35; Reichman, supra note 6, at 263-64.
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democracy and civil participation. distorts social reality."9 In this view,
cities "can be and have been, formed by the voluntary association of their
citizens, while the original constitution of a homeowners association might well
be the work of a developer without the participation of a single person who
becomes a resident of the community.95
Ultimately, any conclusions that are drawn with regard to the individual
decisions of the community concerning the residents requires further
investigation into the motivation behind the establishment of the community and
the nature of the social relations that binds these communities together, whether
it is shared values, convenience, or something else entirely.' This leads,
however, to the broader question: what really makes a community private? Or
in other words, what allows individuals to withdraw from the broader local or
national society, particularly when that withdrawal may affect the rights of
others who are not part of their "community?"
B. Public and Private
The issue undergirding any discussion of "private" communities, both
legally and conceptually, is the meaning of the concept of "private." At what
point does the community become public enough so that it should be held
accountable for its actions as would any public official or governmental
entity?' By any standard, these associations clearly strain the distinction
between public and private." The challenge comes in determining where the
94. Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 46 (1989).
95. Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1589,
1589 (1982). See also Alexander, supra note 94, at 56 (noting that even if the words governing the
association are meaningful and literal in what they aim to define, they may be shortsighted in that
they fail to differentiate the many possible reasons for association). See also Reichman, supra note
6, at 255 ("A home buyer cannot possibly know in advance what regulations he will face in the
future.").
96. Alexander, supra note 94, at 41-42.
97. The protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights apply to citizens of the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, and require a finding of state action. See Weakland,
supra note 15, at 320. See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
98. Tarlock, supra note 22, at 76. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
explained:
Clearly, RCAs cannot be regarded as local governments in the same sense as a
municipality, nor can they be regarded as full-fledged partners in the intergovernmental
system. Nevertheless, for the purpose of understanding the place and role of RCAs in
local governance, as well as the costs and benefits of RCAs for both citizens and
governments, an intergovernmental perspective on RCAs is more useful than a
traditional corporate or neighborhood association perspective.
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 13.
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line should be drawn. As our discussion illustrates, different theories emphasize
different characteristics to support classifications of public and private.
Perhaps the best way to begin to analyze private residential communities or
associations is to appreciate their inherent dual nature: that they are "private
communities within public communities."" As one commentator has noted,
"the words public and private may seem distinct enough-and they are used in
popular and political discourse as if they were-but they are not.""
1. The "Public" Argument
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) Report
on Residential Community Associations notes that RCAs "exist simultaneously
within and outside of the governmental system."' 0 ' But the report continues
that "because RCAs are communities of people that perform public functions,
they are necessarily actors in interlocal intergovernmental relations. "" By
regulating the use of property, owning and maintaining common property, and
providing traditionally public services, the RCAs are, or closely resemble, quasi-
governmental entities paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of a municipal government. "As a 'mini-government,' the
association provides to its members, in almost every case, utility services, road
maintenance, street and common area lighting, and refuse removal. In many
cases, it also provides security services and various forms of communication
within the community."103 Moreover, the RCAs' functions are financed
through assessments, much like taxes, levied upon members of the community,
with power vested in the board of directors or another body analogous to the
governing body of a municipality."° The articles of incorporation, bylaws,
and other rules and regulations are executed in the same way as are the laws of
public governments.'5 These boards have sanctioning power and can impose
fines or restrict common facility use privileges, which also represents a quasi-
governmental power directly affecting individual property rights."'
99. Tarlock, supra note 22, at 75. There is a long history of private associations as
.governments within a government." See MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 123 (citing the writings of
Thomas Hobbes and others).
100. Id. at 123-24.
101. RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 13.
102. Id.
103. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 25, at 918 (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 127.
106. Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 25, at 919.
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In many ways, local governments are both partners that encourage RCAs
as well as beneficiaries of their activities. 7 For example, cities have an
interest in helping RCAs to remain financially solvent and well managed so that
they do not dissolve and shift their responsibilities to the local city
government."' This type of "interconnected relation" has led some to go so
far as to suggest that homeowners' associations are privately owned and operated
"shadow governments" that "can rigidly control immense residential areas." 09
Under this view, virtually any action taken by the community would constitute
governmental or state action. Others have described the relationship between
the association and the local government as an interdependent one that
"transforms its basic nature from private to public. ""'°
Community associations and developments have been equated with private
governments because of their similarity with large corporate structures."'
Some of the scholars who advocate this theory have suggested a checklist to help
determine whether a corporation, and by analogy a residential association, is a
private government, and therefore required to honor constitutional protection for
individuals interacting with those communities." 2 One model outlines five
elements which, if present in some combination, would indicate that the
association is a private government: "(1) an authoritative allocation of principal
functions; (2) a symbolic system for the ratification of collective decisions; (3)
an operating system of command; (4) a system of rewards and punishments; and
(5) institutions for the enforcement of the common rules.""' Many of these
characteristics are represented in the private residential association through the
governing documents, the election of board members, and the ability to enforce
CC&Rs. 14'
As additional support for the proposition that associations act as private
governments, it has been noted that the board of directors:
[E]xhibit, to a significant extent, certain fundamental political
107. There is an additional quasi-governmental power exerted by residential associations in the
form of political pressure and influence on local governments, as well as specific "interlocal
agreements" between residential associations and local governments. Nelson, supra note 3, at 10.
108. See RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 5.
109. GARREAU, supra note 14, at 187.
110. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 778.
111. See MCKENZIE, supra note 6, at 133; Weakland, supra note 15, at 302-07 (discussing in
particular the potential quasi-governmental nature of condominiums). The Supreme Court in Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 189 (1923), defined a municipal corporation as a political subdivision
of the state.
112. McKENZIE, supra note 6, at 133-36.
113. Id. at 133 (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 133-34.
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characteristics. In ways circumscribed by the ultimate coercive
sanctions of public governments, private governments exercise power
over both members and non-members, often in vital areas of
individuals and social concern. They make and apply rules affecting
and limiting the behavior of members. Often they have well-
developed systems of legislation, adjudications and execution, and at
least rudimentary electoral and federal systems. In organizational
form, they run the gamut from authoritarian to populist."'
Another persuasive source for the view that associations are private
governments is the evidence culled from historical studies of the early literature
that was generated by proponents of common interest developments and
homeowners associations. Such studies and commentaries demonstrate that these
pioneers in the field understood that "they were creating residential private
governments. 
"
"
16
2. The Private Approach
While not disputing the largely public aspects or "governmental" features
of homeowner associations, some observers still reach the conclusion that "these
entities are nevertheless of a 'private' nature," because they are "based on
private initiative, private money, private property and private law
concepts."" 7 "The mandatory homeowners' association in a common interest
development is a privately owned political entity-a private government," but
one that needs government support and regulation to function successfully.'
Furthermore, under this view, RCAs "are private organizations governed
by real estate contract law and are not bound by some of the rules of conduct
which, of necessity, bind public organizations. ""' In short, this interpretation
relies on the traditions of private contracts and property law in which
landowners have dominion to their property.
3. The Middle Approach
There are clearly both public and private features to residential associations.
Even many who support the conclusion that homeowners organizations should
be viewed as private, rather than "public" cities, find numerous features that the
115. Id. at 134-35 (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
117. Reichman, supra note 6, at 255-56.
118. Barton & Silverman, supra note 17, at 31. The authors caution against using these
associations to carry out traditional public functions. Id.
119. RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 18, at 1.
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two share,' including control of territory, providing security and facilities,
determining how homes are physically transfigured and how people conduct
themselves, property assessments that are virtually identical to taxes, and
governmental qualities of their boards of directors.' This "mixed bag" leads
some theorists, either explicitly or implicitly, to characterize these governments
as neither fully public nor private, but of an "intermediate" status.1
2
Because RCAs have characteristics of both private and public organizations,
the middle approach may be yet another area of the law in which a "balancing
test" could become the chosen method of adjudication. " While there are
many similarities between residential associations and municipal governments,
"these similarities are not, in themselves, sufficient to constitute state action,"
but rather depend on the presence of a number of different factors.
124
One possible interpretation of this "intermediate" view is to distinguish
between the intra-community and inter-community effects. To this end, while
it may be argued that "the legal devices employed to bind homeowners to the
observance of the necessary rules are private law devices,"" this would not
be so for those outsiders who may have some need to interact with a member
or representative of the community from outside.
120. Ellickson, supra note 38, at 1520.
121. Id. at 1522-25.
122. Id. Professor Ellickson quotes Professor Frank Michelman's one sentence suggestion to
help calculate whether a community is public or private:
We know perfectly well, granting that there are intermediate hard cases, how to
distinguish governmental from non-governmental powers and forms of organization:
governments are distinguished by their acknowledged, lawful authority-not dependent
on property ownership-to coerce- a territorially defined and imperfectly voluntary
membership by acts of regulation, taxation, and condemnation, the exercise of which
authority is determined by majoritarian and representative procedures.
Id. at 1521-22 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Role: Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977)). While
Ellickson realizes that this interpretation is not definitive, and that it actually helps to identify or
point to many "public" indicia of private organizations, it also leads him to the conclusion that there
is only one essential quality to create a public organization, which itself is a source of explanation
for the different treatment of public and private organizations-the presence of involuntary members
in public organizations versus the wholly voluntary membership in a private organization. Id. at
1523.
123. See Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585 (1988). The
balancing test "directs a judge to eschew the application of formal rules in deciding a case, and
instead to balance the competing interests of the litigants (or the competing interests of society more
generally), and to give judgment for the side with the weightier interests." Id. at 586. The author
offers an examination of the broad range of legal areas in which the balancing test is used, providing
examples from several states. Id. at 606-11.
124. Rosenberry, supra note 39, at 22-25.
125. Reichman, supra note 6, at 255.
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Several commentators have suggested a multi-tiered process of review,
which recognizes the limitations of defining such associations as strictly private
or strictly public."2  One theory suggests applying different standards of
review based specifically on whether the challenge is from a resident or a non-
resident."z Others have suggested a multi-tiered test based not on membership
in the association, but on: a) the reasonableness of the action, b) the extent of
the involvement of the State, and c) whether the association exceeded its powers
granted by the state, or d) takes on additional governmental roles."~ In
virtually every case, however, the ultimate question seems to be factually based,
with state action being applied when "the facts warrant such a finding."1 "9
Each result will be fact driven, a conclusion that has important implications for
legal analysis at both the federal and state levels.
IV. THE LEGAL PRECEDENT
Whether residential associations and their accompanying CC&Rs are
created as an alternative to local government and thus assume many of the
functions normally associated with local government begs the question of
whether RCA policies and board of directors' actions constitute "state action."
If such policies and actions do constitute state action, then the question becomes
what consequence will varying constitutional standards have on a party's cause
of action. What follows is first, a general outline of the federal precedent with
special attention to two analogies that are particularly pertinent: cases involving
company towns and shopping centers. " Second, is a brief look at how
several individual states have interpreted their state constitutions on the question
of state action.
The early 1980s set the stage in both federal and state courts in this area
of the law. In this period, the Supreme Court handed down several important
rulings that outlined how and whether the state action determination would be
126. See Weakland, supra note 15, at 329-31; Ellickson, supra note 38, at 1520-23; Kennedy,
supra note 35, at 789-93.
127. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 782. The author suggests that with respect to claims by non-
members, the associations should be treated as state actors, assuming the facts warrant such a
finding, and with respect to claims made by members, so long as prior consent was given to the
restrictions or rules in question, a "reasonableness" test would apply. Id. at 782-83.
128. Weakland, supra note 15, at 330.
129. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 782.
130. Federal constitutional interpretation in this area, discussed below, has seen little change
in recent years. Developments in this field are coming more in the state arena as state courts
interpret their state constitutions more broadly than comparable federal provisions. SectionV of this
article, which summarizes a number of recent state decisions, offers a taste of the developments in
this area.
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applied,' and whether the "company town" analysis or its modem analogy,
the shopping center, would be used for determining what factors establish the
parameters of the public/private distinction." These holdings, and more
specifically the divided nature of the Court in addressing this question, illustrate
the struggle that has taken place. The debate points to the significant challenges
facing all courts interpreting these rulings and applying state constitutional
provisions.
A. The Federal Constitutional Analysis
In 1982, in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company, 33 the Supreme Court set
forth a two part test for determining if the deprivation of a federal right may be
fairly attributed to the state.
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the state, or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
state or by a person for whom the state is responsible. . . . Second,
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor [either] because he is a state official,
or because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid
from state officials, because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
state. '34
Over time, the determination of whether state action exists has fallen under two
distinct forms of analyses: the symbiotic relationship theory and the public
function/company town theory.'35
1. The Symbiotic Relationship Test
The symbiotic relationship test predated the analysis of Lugar. The
Supreme Court identified a symbiotic relationship between a private party and
the state in the 1961 decision in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.3 6
In Burton, the Court held that a restaurant located in a publicly owned and
operated automobile parking building which refused to serve a black patron was
a state actor because the restaurant's leasing of the property "constituted a
131. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
132. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
133. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
134. Id. at 937.
135. See, e.g., Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Assoc., 502 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla.
1984). See also Rosenberry, supra note 39, at 11-25; Lino S. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional
Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777 (1989) (critiquing the state action doctrine and "judicial activism").
136. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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physically and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the State's
plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit . . . [Their] peculiar
relationship.. . confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits."137
Though the test is somewhat vague, it is clear that the level of involvement
requires more than simply state regulation of the private party."s
Whether a residential association should be considered a state actor must
be based on the specific facts of the case, no matter which analysis prevails:
purely private, purely public, or intermediate. In general, however, under the
symbiotic relationship analysis, the greater burden would seem to be on the
association to prove that it is not a state actor. This could be either, as an initial
step, a demonstration that the state was not involved per se in the association's
creation, or that the specific actions, location or regulations of the association
did not interfere with a non-resident's constitutional rights. For example, it
would be up to the association to demonstrate why its control of a public street
takes precedence over the free speech rights of an individual trying to picket a
resident of the private development from one of those streets. Interdependence
seems to arise when the private entity makes an unconstitutional choice and
relies upon the state to effectuate that choice. 139 This approach may lead to
the implementation of a balancing test."
137. Id. at 723-24.
138. See, e.g., Rendell Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yartesky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
139. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988). See Kennedy,
supra note 35 at 787.
140. The balancing test, which has been applied in a variety of legal areas, has attracted both
supporters and critics. See, e.g., Vincent Luizzi, Balancing of Interests in Courts, 20 JURIMETrICS
J. 373 (1980); McFadden, supra note 123, at 622-43. Some argue that balancing allows for greater
simplicity, as courts are able to reduce disagreement among parties to a single variable, i.e., the
factor that is being weighed. Luizzi, supra at 376. But others have cautioned that this test may be
deceptively simple. See McFadden, supra note 123, at 623. Professor McFadden argues that courts
are likely to find that applying some sort of utilitarian calculus to a particular case can be at least
as difficult as it would be to use the more traditional method of legal analysis. See id. at 622-25.
A significant appeal of the balancing test is that it allows for more ease and flexibility in
reaching a just result. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978). Professor Henkin has written that "[balancing] bespeaks
moderation and reasonableness, the Golden Mean . . . . It softens the rigors of absolutes, makes
room for judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree." Id. at 1047. Opponents, however,
counter that this flexibility may threaten fundamental liberties. See McFadden, supra note 123, at
636-40. To this end, Justice Hugo Black has written that:
Constitutional adjudication under the balancing method becomes simply a matter of this
Court's deciding for itself which result in a particular case seems in the circumstances
the more acceptable governmental policy and then stating the facts in such a way that
the considerations in the balance lead to the result.
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-144 (1959) (Black, I., dissenting).
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2. The Public Function or Company Town Test
The other test for whether state action exists is known as the public function
or "functional equivalent of a municipality"' 4' theory, which found its primary
annunciation in the early post-World War II case of Marsh v. Alabama,42
which examined the issue of state action in the context of a "company town."
In Marsh, the Supreme Court held that citizens of Chicasaw, Alabama, a town
wholly owned (including the buildings, commercial establishments, streets, and
sewers) by Gulf Ship-building Corporation, could not be denied the liberties
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to citizens of the states. 43
The case involved a challenge by a Jehovah's Witness to a town prohibition
on distributing religious literature. The Court held that there was state action
because the town "ha[d] all the characteristics of any other American
town,"" and because it did "not function differently from any other
town."'" The Court noted that the "'business block' [of the town] serves as
the community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people
in the area and those passing through."'" The Court further noted:
[T]hat the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of
liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public,
is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern
a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and
the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state
statute. 147
The Court did not explicitly endorse the direct correlation between private
government and corporation, choosing instead a more graduated approach:
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it."'" In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Frankfurter
took the next step, noting: "Title to property as defined by State law controls
property relations; it cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely
because a company town is a town as well as a congeries of property
141. See Rosenberry, supra note 39, at 20-25.
142. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
143. Id. at 508-09.
144. Id. at 502.
145. Id. at 508.
146. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
147. Id. at 509.
148. Id. at 506.
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relations. "1
49
a. Pullman: A Model Company Town
The concept of the company town offers a fruitful model with which to
compare today's private communities. The first company towns emerged in
New England Textile manufacturing regions shortly after the War of 1812.'4
In these towns, which were generally owned and operated by large corporations,
citizens earned their salary through their work at the town factory while the
manufacturing interests "benefit[ed] substantially by a contented, skilled labor
force drawn by a policy of intelligent and careful attention to employee welfare
and comfort. "151
One such town that serves as an "ideal type," both for the successes and
the potential dangers of this form of development, is Pullman, built just outside
Chicago and opened for residents in 1881.'52 Although the Pullman Company
was not the first to build an urban industrial community, it thrived because it
promised to, and, at least for a limited period, did remedy the needs and fears
of working people. Unlike failed experimental towns that were based on ideas
of communitarianism and socialism that had come before it,'53 Pullman was
founded on the concrete principles and common sense ideas of "industry,
sobriety, [and] economy," rather than fanciful, abstract philosophies." Much
like some of the newer private communities today, Pullman was a response to
deeply rooted dissatisfaction about modern industrialization and urbanization,
"the disorderly and unstable culture of the Chicagos of the world, ""' which
149. Id. at 511 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
150. LISTON EDGINOTON LEYENDECKER, PALACE CAR PRINCE - A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE
MORTIMER PULLMAN 165 (1992).
151. Id. at 171; DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE, 281-
91(1973).
152. STANLEY BUDER, PULLMAN- AN EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL ORDER AND COMMUNITY
PLANNING 53 (1967). See also LEYENDECKER, supra note 150, at 168.
153. CARL SMITH, URBAN DISORDER AND THE SHAPE OF DISBELIEF - THE GREAT CHICAGO
FIRE, THE HAYMARKBT BOMB, AND THE MODEL TOWN OF PULLMAN 189 (1995); BOORSTIN, supra
note 151, at 281-83. One of the earliest and most influential sources for town planning was
Ebenezer Howard's 1898 book, original published as To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform,
and reissued four years later as Garden Cities of To-morrow. EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES
OF TO-MORROW (F.J Osborn ed., 1965). Among these early towns were places like New Harmony,
Indiana, and Brook Farm, in West Roxbury, Massachusetts, communal living experiments based on
idyllic philosophies of well-being of mind, spirit, and body achieved through the rational thinking
and honest, mental or physical work. Unfortunately, when finances dwindled in these communities,
they were unable to sustain themselves and the communities collapsed. See 2 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 549 (15th ed. 1985); 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 637
(15th ed. 1985). See also 'NEW TOWNS' WHY - AND FOR WHOM? supra note 12.
154. SMITH, supra note 153, at 189.
155. Id. at 209.
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bred hope and anticipation within the troubled, urban public.
The town of Pullman differed from Chicago and other municipalities not
only because it was beyond the city limits, but also because it was private
property. " The land was owned by the Pullman Company and run by an
employee, designated as the town agent. 7 One journalist even headlined his
story about the new town, "Visit to the Eighth Wonder of the World, the New
City of Pullman."'"8
Amenities not easily accessible to the working class of Chicago were
available to the residents of Pullman. When compared with the difficult
conditions of Chicago, the public services of the Pullman town, gas, water,
indoor plumbing, sewerage, and regular garbage removal, were particularly
appealing."5 9 Yet even though these benefits might have led some to view this
and similar towns as potential havens, the town of Pullman was at its heart a
business venture. George Pullman was a shrewd entrepreneur who understood
the value of morale in the workplace. Ignoring the miserable working and living
conditions of one's employees did not make good business sense. He believed
the town of Pullman would confirm that "money could be safely invested in an
elaboration of the utilitarian into the artistic and beautiful. '6
This business-oriented approach to community led to many criticisms, the
most prominent of which argued that these towns were little more than an
exercise in paternalism, resulting in a loss of independence for the citizens. 6
It is an argument that continues to be echoed in modern discussions of today's
private communities.' 62 The manner in which George Pullman provided so
completely for his employees included a great deal more than a profit-minded
business mentality and came to be known as the "Pullman Idea."'" This
highly cooperative atmosphere was created by the lack of dissent which was
built into the Pullman environment. "[W]hat enabled this polity to run without
a government was the total authority of George Pullman." 164
156. Id. at 180.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 183.
159. Id. at 181.
160. Id. at 184. See BOORSTIN, supra note 151, at 282.
161. See BOORSTIN, supra note 151, at 283 (citing economist Richard Ely's observation at the
time that "[tihe idea of Pullman is un-American . . . . It is benevolent, well-wishing feudalism,
which desires the happiness of the people, but in such a way as shall please the authorities.").
162. See Foer, supra note 12, at 393 (noting that if a developer is too paternalistic, it will pose
a danger in the construction and development of healthy private communities).
163. SMITH, supra note 153, at 185.
164. Id. at 188.
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Despite the notion that the residents of Pullman lived in an urban utopia,
residents had no property interest and therefore lacked long-term security.
Moreover, the living habits of tenants were monitored by the company, and
censorship was common, because a citizen's comments could be reported at any
time. Without internal news, no independent political or moral voice existed.
When a group of employees attempted a strike in 1885, the participants and
anyone associated with the plan were labeled subversives. The opinion of one
observer of that period, Richard Ely, an economics professor, was characterized
by the statement: "Pullman was a city that paid a very high cost in human
rights for its beauty and order."'6
b. The Shopping Mall as a "Modem Private Fortress"
The Court's decision in Marsh, placing constitutional restrictions on
company-owned towns like Pullman, led directly to a number of subsequent
rulings concerning the shopping mall. Like the main thoroughfares of the
traditional town, shopping malls today are more than simply an assembled
collection of stores, but rather a centralized location for activities now
interconnected, ranging from shopping to dining to residences to work
environments and hotels." On their surface, malls have precisely what the
old medieval marketplace offered: the opportunity for unlimited interchange.
It is the concept of mall as modern public marketplace and forum for
expression and the exchange of ideas that helped lead the Warren Court in 1968
to hold in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza," that a privately owned shopping center could not restrict speech by
prohibiting individuals from picketing the employment practices of businesses
within that shopping center.'" The Court, by a six to three vote, noted that
"[the similarities between the business block in Marsh and the shopping center
in the present case are striking,"'" and "[t]he shopping center here is clearly
the functional equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw involved in
Marsh."'o
While holding that the mall, unlike the town owners in Marsh, did not have
the power to totally deny the picketers access to the mall community, the Court
165. Id. at 206.
166. Judd, supra note 17, at 146-47.
167. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
168. Id. at 325. See also id. at 324 (noting that the economic development of the United States
in the 20 years since Marsh supports its opinion). The Court identified the significant change in
shopping trends and the need to ensure that workers seeking to challenge business prsctices have
direct access to those businesses for first amendment related purposes. Id. at 324-25.
169. Id. at 317.
170. Id. at 318.
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reasoned this was not determinative because "[tihe shopping center premises are
open to the public to the same extent as the commercial center of a normal
town." 7' The Logan Valley majority also noted that the owners of such
shopping centers can make reasonable regulations of First Amendment
expression on their property."r The impact of Logan Valley was muted not
only because of the narrowness of its holding, but because the dissent, raising
the shield of the Fifth Amendment, was written by Justice Black, who had been
the author of the majority opinion in Marsh."7' Within four years of Logan
Valley, the Court further restricted the holding, concluding in Lloyd Corporation
v. Tanner74 that a shopping center did have the authority as a "private entity"
to prohibit five individuals who tried to distribute literature protesting the
Vietnam War from doing so within their shopping center. The Court
distinguished Logan Valley by noting that the First Amendment activity did not
specifically concern any of the merchants within the shopping center."5 The
Court stated:
Logan Valley extended Marsh to a shopping center situation in a
171. Amalagated Food Employers Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
318-19 (1968).
172. Id. at 320. The Court added:
Certainly their rights to make such regulations are at the very least co-extensive with the
powers possessed by States and municipalities, and recognized in many opinions of this
Court, to control the use of public property. Thus, where property is not ordinarily
open to the public, this Court has held that access to it for the purpose of exercising
First Amendment rights may be denied altogether .... Even where municipal or state
property is open to the public generally, the exercise of First Amendment rights may
be regulated so as to prevent interference with the use to which the property is
ordinarily put by the State . . . [or] where such exercise will unduly interfere with the
normal use of the public property by other members of the public with an equal right
of access to it.
Id. at 320-21.
173. Id. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black wrote that he could not accept the
majority's opinion because:
I believe that, whether this Court likes it or not, the Constitution recognizes
and supports the concept of private ownership of property. The Fifth
Amendment provides that '[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.' This means to me that there is
no right to picket on the private premises of another to try to convert the
owner or others to the views of the pickets. It also means, I think, that if
this Court is going to arrogate to itself the power to act as the Government's
agent to take a part of [the] property to give to the pickets for their use, the
Court should also award [the property owner] just compensation for the
property taken.
Id. at 330.
174. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
175. Id. at 560-61.
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different context from the company town setting, but it did so only in
a context where the First Amendment activity was related to the
shopping center's operations. There is some language in Logan Valley
unnecessary to the decision, suggesting that the key focus of Marsh
was upon the "business district," and that whenever a privately owned
business district serves the public generally its sidewalks and streets
become the functional equivalents of similar public facilities. As Mr.
Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley emphasized, this would be an
incorrect interpretation of the Court's decision in Marsh.76
While the majority acknowledged that "differences exist... with respect
to government regulation or rights of citizens arising by virtue of the size and
diversity of activities carried on within a privately owned facility serving the
public," they explained that:
[P]roperty [does not] lose its private character merely because the
public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes .... The
essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting
property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with
other stores in a modem shopping center."7
The four dissenting justices countered that the record overwhelmingly
supported the district court's finding that "'the Mall is the functional equivalent
of a public business district' within the meaning of Marsh and Logan. . . . In
sum, the Lloyd Center is an integral part of the Portland community . . .
[which,] [f]rom its inception, the city viewed . . . as a 'business district.'""~
The dissent also argued that, as the district court found, the mall was open to
first amendment activity, and therefore it could not discriminate against the non-
disruptive distribution of the leaflets in this case."
176. Id. at 562. The Court also distinguished Logan Valley on the basis of physical layout,
noting that "the Union pickets in that case would have been deprived of all reasonable opportunity
to covey their message to patrons of the Weis store [they were picketing] had they been denied
access to the shopping center," whereas at the Lloyd Center, "[a]ll persons . . . enterling] or
leav[ing] the private areas within the complex must cross public streets and sidewalks, either on foot
or in automobiles." Id. at 566.
177. Id. at 569-70. The Court noted that "[tihere will be, for example, problems with respect
to public health and safety which vary in degree and in the appropriate government response,
depending upon the size and character of a shopping center, an office building, a sports arena, or
other large facility serving the public for commercial purposes." Id. at 570.
178. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 575-76 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 579-83.
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The third act in this post-Marsh Supreme Court trilogy was played out four
years later in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board. " In Hudgens, the
Court explicitly overruled Logan Valley and held that a shopping center could
even prevent expression such as picketing against an individual business in the
shopping center.'' The Court reasoned that "the reasoning of the Court's
opinion in Lloyd cannot be squared with the reasoning of the Court's opinion in
Logan Valley." "~ The Hudgens Court further concluded that:
[I]f the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a First Amendment
right to enter that shopping center to distribute handbills concerning
Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a First
Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of
advertising their strike .... [1]n short, under the present state of the
law the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play
in a case such as this .... 183
c. The Federal Withdrawal: Pruneyard
The year 1980 also saw what might be termed an epilogue to the drama,
or a new first act for the unfolding story of renewed judicial federalism. The
United States Supreme Court, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robinss'
declined to apply the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments to the federal
Constitution, instead upholding the California Supreme Court 5 decision which
stated that the California Constitution gave individuals broader rights of
expression than the federal Constitution. 86 The California court's decision
stood in direct contrast to the Supreme Court's holding in Hudgens, and
protected reasonably exercised speech and petitioning in privately owned
shopping centers, in essence, adopting the reasoning of the majority in Logan
180. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
181. Id. at 518-21. The Court again was somewhat splintered in its vote, with five justices
agreeing with the Court's opinion, another justice concurring, and two justices dissenting. (Justice
Stevens did not participate in the case.) Id. at 523-25.
182. Id. at 518.
183. Id. at 520-21.
184. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
185. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
186. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 81. The Court noted that the California Constitution offered
specific affirmative rights for speech and petitioning. Article one, Section two of the California
Constitution provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty
of speech or press." Article one, Section three of the California Constitution provides: "[Pleople
have the right to . . . petition government for redress of grievances." Id. at 80 n.2.
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Valley, but using a state constitutional analysis as the basis." 7 The Pruneyard
Court also declined to find a "takings" violation in this broader interpretation
of the law, denying the mall owners' claim that forcing the owners to permit all
speech in the mall was a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,
thereby rejecting the dissent of Justice Black in Logan Valley."s
In the wake of Pruneyard, states have greater freedom, and a greater
burden, in deciding cases involving issues of public, private, and constitutional
rights. They must determine whether their constitutions are to be interpreted
more broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution,
and they must choose the legal analysis to apply: the public (Marsh/company
187. In Robins, the California Supreme Court recognized that large retail shopping centers are
today's suburban town's functional equivalent of the traditional town center business block where
first amendment activity traditionally was conscientiously guarded. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 345-48 (Cal. 1979).
188. Prunyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980). Although takings clause
issues more traditionally involve formal government condemnation proceedings, there has been an
increase in litigation involving what is known as regulatory takings, actions taken to fight allegedly
excessive government regulation of private property. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory
Takings: Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 URn. LAW. 389, 390 (1988); Jonathan B. Sallet,
Regulatory 'Takings' and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a Solution Continues,
in REGULATORY TAKING - THE LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 155, 157-60 (G. Richard Hill ed.,
1990). One early source for this jurisprudence is Justice Holmes comment in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922): "The general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
In rejecting the "Takings" claim in Pnuneyard, the Court agreed that one of the "essential
sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others." Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82.
But the Court added that in reviewing an action for a takings clause violation, it must examine
whether the restriction "forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 83 (citing Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). In reaching this decision, the Court will look into a series of factors,
including the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
175 (1979)). In Pruneyard, the Court concluded that "[t]here is nothing to suggest" that preventing
the shopping center owners from prohibiting the "activity will unreasonably impair the value or use
of their property as a shopping center." Id.
The Court distinguished its decision in Pruneyard from its earlier opinion in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), in which it held that the federal government's efforts to compel
free public use of a private marina constituted a taking. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84. In Kaiser
Aetna, the government said it had the right to use of the marina on the ground that the marina
became subject to federal navigational servitudes because of a channel dredged by the owners that
connected it to "navigable water." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168-69. The marina had been
converted from a private pond by the developer-owners, who had also built a surrounding marina
community which paid a fee to use the marina and to "maintain the privacy and security of the
pond." Id. at 168. The Court concluded that the Government's effort at creating a public right of
access to the pond in its improved state interfered with the owner's "reasonable investment backed
expectations" and went "so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation as to
amount to a taking. . . ." Id. at 178.
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town) approach, the extension of this to privately owned shopping centers
(Logan Valley), or the private approach (Hudgens).
But, as the case law makes clear, it is difficult to state categorically that a
quasi-public structure such as a residential association is either public or private.
Although, at its core, this analysis can be applied to the interpretation of
contracts between the parties, as would befit a purely private analysis, or the
state action doctrine can be applied, as would befit a purely public analysis,
there are very few instances in which either can be used strictly or uniformly.
Rather, state courts have begun to base their analysis within the context of
the individual state constitutions, which balances the public features of each
community such as roads, sewers, and security, with the private attributes,
including the development's construction, legal system, and of course, the
property ownership itself. As one state court would declare, in this area of the
law, "[t]he definitive word was left to the state courts to write."1 9
B. The State Constitutional Analysis
The Supreme Court's decision in Pruneyard is one of the leading cases at
both the state and federal level to identify the important, legitimate, and
independent role that state courts play in protecting individual rights by
interpreting a state constitution to provide protection beyond what is recognized
by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. It reaffirmed
Justice Louis Brandeis' view of the obvious merits of our federal system, "that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. " 190
Although the number of decisions that have applied state constitutional
provisions to private communities and, more specifically, to the protection of the
rights of non-members' is still limited, there are certain areas in which these
principles have had more testing. Not surprisingly, the issue addressed by the
Court in Pruneyard, the conflict between public speech at private businesses in
shopping malls, is one such arealg-and one in which state courts have taken
189. Bock v. Westminister Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991).
190. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
191. Although this brief survey focuses on public rights of expression in private shopping
centers, there are other types of private property in which state courts have explored the conflict
between public and private and applied their state constitutions. See, e.g., Laguna Publishing Co.
v. Golden Rain, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal Ct. App. 1982) (finding violation of the California
Constitution, not the federal Constitution, in case of planned, gated community barring distribution
of outside newspaper); Isbister v. Boys Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (holding
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divergent paths in applying their state constitutions to this doctrine. "9
This Section explores, through a review of the holdings of several state
courts, how these courts are using their state constitutions to resolve the legal
questions. The courts in California, Washington, Ohio, and New Jersey have
proceeded in different ways along the continuum established by the Supreme
Court to give a new interpretation to the public-private debate.
1. California: Fact-Based Private Interest Balancing
Although the ultimate issue decided by the California Supreme Court in
Pruneyard was whether the California Constitution protected speech and
petitioning at shopping centers, the threshold question was: did the Supreme
Court's ruling in Lloyd v. Tanner "recognize federally protected property rights
of such a nature that we now are barred from ruling that the California
Constitution creates broader speech rights as to private property than does the
federal Constitution?""9
Previous state court rulings in California had suggested that a more
expansive ruling under the California Constitution was barred by the federal
Supremacy Clause because under Lloyd, "the due process clause of the United
States Constitution protects the property interest of the shopping center owner
from infringement,"' but in Pruneyard, the California Supreme Court found
that property rights were not immune from state regulation.1 95
Rather, in language that offers support to state courts looking to balance
property rights with individual or public rights, the Court stated:
Property rights must yield to the public interest served by zoning laws,
to environmental needs, and to many other public concerns. "We do
not minimize the importance of the constitutional guarantees attaching
to private ownership of property; but as long as 50 years ago it was
that private charitable organization's rejection of menbership applications on basis of gender violated
California law); State v. Elliott, 548 A.2d 28 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding no constitutional right
to conduct anti-abortion demonstration on property of health organization); Fardig v. Anchorage,
785 P.2d 911 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (holding no right under state or federal constitution to protest
in private health facility parking lot).
192. See New Jersey Coalition Against War v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994)
(describing several different state constitutional interpretations).
193. Robins v. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979).
194. Id. at 343.
195. Id. at 344. The California courts had previously decided to expressly follow the holding
inLloyd Corp. v. Tanner. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 86-87 n.9 (1980)
(discussing the changing history of this issue in California courts).
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already 'thoroughly established in this country that the rights preserved
to the individual by these constitutional provisions are held in
subordination to the rights of society .... As the interest of society
justifies restraints upon individual conduct, so also does it justify
restraints upon the use to which property may be devoted ....
Where the interest of the individual conflicts with the interest of
society, such individual interest is subordinated to the general
welfare. '"96
The Pruneyard court then applied this analysis to the facts, concluding that
"[t]o protect free speech and petitioning is a goal that surely matches the
protecting of health and safety, the environment, aesthetics, property values and
other societal goals that have been held to justify reasonable restrictions on
private property rights."" 9  Since Pruneyard, several states have followed
California's lead in this area. 198
2. Washington: A Path of State Constitutional Narrowing
In Alderwood Assocociates v. Washington Environmental Council,"9 a
plurality of the Washington Supreme Court favorably compared the Washington
Constitution's speech provision' with the California provision at issue in
196. Pruneyard, 592 P.2d at 34445 (citations omitted).
197. Robins v. Pnzneyard, 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979).
198. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores
Int'l Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); State v.
Dameron, 853 P.2d 1285 (Or. 1993); State v. Cargill, 786 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981); Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtd.
Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981).
199. 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981).
200. The Washington Constitution states: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Washington also has a provision concerning eminent domain which expands upon the Fifth
Amendment. That section states:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity,
and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural,
domestic, or sanitary purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for
public or private use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into
court for the owner, and no right-of-way shall be appropriated to the use of any
corporation other than municipal until full compensation therefor be first made in
money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be
ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of
record, in the manner prescribed by law. Whenever an attempt is made to take private
property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be
really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any
legislative assertion that the use is public: Provided, that the taking of private property
by the state for land reclamation and settlement purposes is hereby declared to be for
Rishikof and Wohl: Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State Will Make t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
544 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
Pruneyard as well as with a decision by a New Jersey court. 1  The Court
held that the speech and initiative provisions of the Washington State
Constitution do not require the same "state action" as does the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and in light of this, seeking of
signatures on a petition at a shopping mall by the environmentalists was a
protected activity.
The court further noted that neither of those state constitutions expressly
mention "state action," thus permitting the state court "to evaluate in each case
the actual harm to the speech and property interests."' The Washington
court explained that this does not mean all speech and initiative activities are
protected because to do so "would deny private autonomy and property rights
in the same way as the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
denies free speech."' Instead, the Washington court adopted a balancing
test, but one that "is quite different from that used in Fourteenth Amendment
analysis. "'
Eight years later, however, in Southcenter Joint Venture v. National
Democratic Policy Committee,' the Washington Supreme Court moved in a
different direction, holding that a political organization had no right under the
Washington Constitution's free speech provision to solicit contributions and sell
literature at privately owned shopping centers. With regard to the "state action"
issue, the court reaffirmed that the free speech provision affords protection to
the individual actions of the state. It "does not protect an individual against the
actions of other private individuals,' concluding that although there is no
express reference to "state action," this limitation is implicit in the
constitution. M
The court explained that the Committee was:
[N]otjust asking us to cast a more expansive interpretation of the state
constitutional provision; in reality, it is asking us to declare that our
public use.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
201. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980). See discussion infra notes 221-32 and
accompanying text.
202. Alderwood, 635 P.2d at 115-16.
203. Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 116 (Wash. 1981).
204. Id. The Washington court, citing federal precedent, balanced "the use and nature of the
private property;" the nature of the speech activity; and the potential for reasonable regulation of
the speech. Id. at 116-17.
205. 780 P.2d 1282 (Wash. 1989).
206. Id. at 1285.
207. Id. at 1288.
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state constitution grants an entirely new kind of free speech right-one
that can be used not only as a shield by private individuals against
actions of the state but also as a sword against other private
individuals."
The court refused to adopt a "balancing test" to weigh the free speech interest
of the two parties, stating that to do so would be legislating, not
adjudicating.'
The court in Southcenter also rejected petitioner's argument that the state
constitution's free speech provision applies to shopping malls under the "public
function" doctrine articulated in Marsh. The court employed the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Lloyd alone in rejecting this argument,
distinguishing shopping malls from company towns.2 0
The rationale used by the Washington Supreme Court in Southcenter has
been applied in a number of states, while still other state courts that also have
not been as receptive to the "new federalism" have used other grounds for
protecting private property rights, sometimes as basic as the statement that the
state constitutional provision is no broader than the comparable federal
section.21'
208. Id. at 1286. The Court further stated:
It is a two foot leap across a ten foot ditch ... to seize upon the absence of a reference
to the State as the actor limited by the state free speech provision and conclude
therefrom that the framers of our state constitution intended to create a bold new right
that conflicts with the fundamental premise on which the entire constitution is based.
Id. at 1287-88.
209. Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282, 1288-89
(Wash. 1989). Notwithstanding this new interpretation, the court held that this ruling was consistent
with Alderwood because five members of that court (one concurring judge and four dissenters)
agreed that the free speech provision of the state constitution required state action.
210. Id. at 1291-92.
211. See Wilhoite v. Melvin Simon and Assoc., 640 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Iowa
v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1991); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337
(Mich. 1985); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 211 (N.Y. 1985); Eastwood Mall
v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986) (plurality opinion); Town of Barrington
v. Blake, 568 A.2d 1015 (R.I. 1990); Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544
(S.C. 1992).
In Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., the Colorado Supreme Court noted Colorado's "tradition
of ensuring a broader liberty of speech" than the federal Constitution. Bock v. Westminster Mall
Co., 819 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Colo. 1991). The court explained that "[w]here governmental entities or
public monies are shown by the facts to subsidize, approve of, or encourage private interests and
such private interests happen also to restrict the liberty to speak and to dissent," the court had the
right to find those actions unconstitutional. Id. at 60. The Colorado court concluded that a finding
of "state action" according to federal doctrine was unnecessary. Id. at 61 n.7. Instead, the court
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3. Ohio: The Federal Standard Revisited Within the Ohio Constitution
In Ohio, a state appellate court took one position in this area which was
subsequently overriden by the Ohio Supreme Court in a later case. In Ferner
v. Toledo-Lucas County Convention and Visitors Bureau, Inc. ,212 a candidate
for the city council challenged a regulation that prohibited him from soliciting
signatures for his nominating petition at the Seagate Convention Centre. The
candidate conceded that he had no First Amendment right to solicit signatures
in a private building and challenged the regulation solely on the provisions
contained in the Ohio Constitution. 21 3
The court explored the two relevant portions of the state constitution and
concluded that unlike the First Amendment, the Ohio speech clause included an
affirmative grant of the right of free speech, and it chose an expansive
interpretation, allowing for "the limited assertion of that right on some forms of
reasoned that "governmental involvement" exists as a result of several factors, including "the City's
two million dollar purchase, financed through the sale of municipal bonds, of improvements which
the Company made to adjacent streets and drainage systems." Id. at 61. The court also noted that
the city operates a police substation in the mall, provided rent free; that the Army, Navy, and the
Marine Corps maintain recruiting offices in the mall; and that the county clerk conducts voter
registration in the mall. Id. at 61-62.
In Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985), the New York Court
of Appeals conducted a legal analysis of the history of the language in New York's Constitution and
determined that there was a state action requirement. Id. at 1214-15. The court agreed with the
dissent that "the willingness of courts to interpret constitutional provisions in light of changing
conditions has safeguarded both our Constitutions and the freedom they protect," but it further noted
that "[t]here is a profound difference . . . between interpreting constitutional provisions and
dispensing with constitutional requirements." Id. at 1216. In explaining that the plaintiffs had
neither alleged nor demonstrated any state action, the court noted that the shopping mall in question:
[I]s not the functional equivalent of a government. . . . To be sure, the
shopping mall has taken on many of the attributes and functions of a public
forum. . . but the characterization or the use of property is immaterial to
the issue of whether State action has been shown. Nor can the nature of
property transform a private actor into a public one. Rather, the analysis
must proceed from the other direction to show significant government
participation in private conduct that limits free speech rights.
Id. at 1217-18 (citations omitted).
212. 610 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
213. Id. at 1161. Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution provides that "[pirivate property shall
ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare." Section 11 provides: "Every citizen
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press."
Id. at 1161-62. Ironically, the issue of state action under the federal Constitution may have been
particularly strong in this case, although it was not raised. The Centre was owned by the Toledo-
Lucas County Convention and Visitors Bureau, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, with seemingly strong
connections to the city and county; a portion of the building was used by the University of Toledo,
a state sponsored school; and the building was located on land that was owned by Lucas County and
leased from the county. Id. at 1160.
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private property, so long as the infringement does not result in a 'taking' of
property. 21 4 The Ohio court then used a balancing test to decide whether the
rights of the public or the private property owner were controlling and found in
favor of free speech.215
Although the court in Ferner noted that the Ohio Supreme Court had not
addressed the issue, it subsequently did so, in Eastwood Mall, Inc. v.
Slanco,216 holding that the speech guarantees accorded by the Ohio
Constitution are no broader than the First Amendment." 7 In a dissenting
opinion to that ruling, however, one justice stated that he did "not believe that
the holding in [Eastwood] affects the decision. . . [in Ferner] because the facts
of the two cases are distinguishable."21 He suggested that "[a] county or
municipal convention center, even if operated as a nonprofit corporation, has
even more indicia of a public forum than a privately owned shopping mall."29
He also offered the opinion that the right to collect signatures for a petition
implicated more than just the free speech provision in the state constitution.=
4. New Jersey: A Broad and Consistent State Constitutional Interpretation
In contrast to some states, New Jersey has stuck consistently to its more
expansive and flexible interpretation of the state constitutional protection
afforded to individuals demonstrating on private property. In New Jersey v.
Schmid,' the court was confronted with a trespassing conviction of Mr.
Schmid who was engaged in the unauthorized distribution of political literature
on the campus of Princeton University. Schmid claimed that he was not obliged
to obtain the permission of Princeton officials to engage in the distribution of the
literature, as such activity is protected by both the New Jersey Constitution and
federal Constitution.' The court initially conducted a traditional First
Amendment analysis. Ultimately, however, because of the lack of clarity in
federal decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to resolve this issue
214. Id. at 1162-63. The court in Femer also looked at the "takings" issue but determined
there was no regulatory taking because "[tihe economic impact is speculative at best [and] the
government does not propose to physically occupy appellant's land, but only to prevent appellant
from wholly prohibiting political speech." Id. at 1161.
215. Id. at 1163.
216. 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994).
217. Id. at 61.
218. Id. at 65 n.8 (Wright, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 65 n.8 (Ohio 1994) (Wright, J.,
dissenting).
221. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
222. Id. at 616.
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or to determine whether "state action" was involved.'z Instead, the court,
citing Pruneyard for support, turned to the state constitution for resolution of the
breakdown between public and private rights.2
The court noted New Jersey's history of interpreting this section of its
constitution expansively, stating that the relevant constitutional language is
"more sweeping in scope than the language of the First Amendment. "'
Citing both federal and state precedents, the Schmid court "balance[d] within a
constitutional framework legitimate interest in private property with individual
freedoms of speech and assembly. "2 It concluded:
[The test to be applied to ascertain the parameters of the rights of
speech and assembly upon privately-owned property and the extent to
which such property reasonably can be restricted to accommodate
these rights involves several elements. This standard must take into
account (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private
property, generally, its "normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the
public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the
expressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both
the private and public use of the property.'m
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the New Jersey court concluded
that Schmid "suffered a constitutional impairment of his state constitutional
rights of speech and assembly and his conviction for trespass must therefore be
undone. "'
In a more recent holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed the
commitment to an expansive view of freedom of expression as defined in the
state constitution. In New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
JMB Realty Corp. ,' the court applied the test developed in Schmid to hold
that private shopping malls must allow free speech, specifically "leafletting and
223. Id. at 624.
224. Id. at 628. The relevant portions of the state constitution state:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press .... The people have the right freely to assemble
together, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their
representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.
N.J. CONST. art. 1, 6, 18.
225. New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626-27 (N.J. 1980).
226. Id. at 628.
227. Id. at 630.
228. Id. at 633.
229. 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
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associated speech in support of, or in opposition to, causes, candidates, and
parties-political and societal free speech. " '3 In reaching this decision, the
court stated that it "know[s] of no private property that more closely resembles
public property."" 3  The New Jersey court reached its decision not only by
applying the Schmid test, "but also by the general balancing of expressional
rights and private property rights."'
This short survey of state court decisions in this area of the law indicates
that there is a variety of legal analysis being employed in the setting of standards
to determine the boundaries and the rights for what is public and what is private
among the citizens of each state. This dual power is precisely as envisioned by
a federalist system with differing state constitutional language protecting and
balancing the public and private rights of their citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
Our nation has a long tradition of protecting individual rights while
encouraging and protecting private contractual agreements and associations for
the betterment of the individual parties and the commonweal. It is important to
understand this historic tension and to ensure that when these two competing
ideas intersect, both of the traditions are safeguarded.
State courts, however, are not necessarily finding it easy going as they
work to interpret and apply these doctrines. The federal holdings in this area
230. Id. at 781.
231. Id. at 761. The court spent a significant portion of the opinion discussing the growing
importance of malls in our society and took judicial notice "of the fact that in every major city of
this state, over the past twenty years, there has been not only a decline, but in many cases a
disastrous decline" of downtown business districts, a decline "accompanied and caused by the
combination of the move of residents from the city to the suburbs and the construction of shopping
centers in those suburbs." Id. at 767. The court concluded by reiterating that it is an "indisputable
fact of life" that "the privately held shopping center now serves as the public trading area for much
of metropolitan America." Id. at 768.
232. Id. at 775. Another New Jersey case with potentially significant implications for private
communities, involving a different issue, but with related legal analysis is Mathews v. Bay Head
Improvement Assoc., 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). In Mathews, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a nonprofit association which controlled access to a municipal beachfront was in violation of the
"public trust" doctrine by denying the right of access to the public to the shorefront water. Id. at
362-68. The court held that the corporation that controlled the area was a quasi-public association,
and that by limiting membership to residents of the municipality and foreclosing the public, the
association was acting in conflict with public policy to encourage and expand public access to and
use of shoreline areas and was frustrating the public's right under the public trust doctrine. Id. at
362-69. The court acknowledged that a private land owner is not equivalent to a municipality but
said that the public's right to the shore is the most important factor and the ultimate conclusion will
depend on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 365. See Charles M. Naselsky, Note, Public Trust
Docnine, 15 SErON HALL L. REv. 344 (1985) (discussing the Mathews case).
Rishikof and Wohl: Private Communities or Public Governments: "The State Will Make t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
550 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
which outline the relationship, power, and rights of private property owners and
public speech have evolved into a complex standard for states, 23 particularly
when state courts may apply their own constitution's language to the facts at
hand. As a result, the holdings offer a mixed bag, generating differences among
the states. 4
Which interpretation or balancing these courts use to reach their results,
whether the federal holding of Hudgens, which grants increased rights to private
property owners, or the opportunity for more expansive state constitutional
interpretation of Pruneyard, which in turn requires a choice between some
version of the Marsh company town approach or the Logan Valley application
to shopping malls, remains to be seen. The legal analysis concerning shopping
malls and individual liberties is an inquiry that highlights the conflicts between
public and private which are occurring in the growing number of residential
associations throughout the nation. Specifically, the courts, through
adjudication, will define the rights of the private property owners and residents
and those of the non-residents who may nonetheless be affected by those
communities and their rules and regulations.
Moreover, the idea that states are able to either equate provisions of their
state constitutions with the comparable provisions in the federal Constitution or,
in the alternative, to interpret the language of those provisions more broadly and
thus provide more expansive protections of individual rights, will likely have
significant implications for private residential associations. For the future, state
courts and legislatures will need to work to balance these interests, reconcile the
differences in federal and state law, and ultimately delineate the line between
public and private. This is an example of how our Federalism works, as both
the state and federal powers define and protect our liberties.
233. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 624 (N.J. 1980) (finding "strong crosscurrents
of policy that must be navigated with extreme care" and ultimately turning to state constitutional
analysis). The opinion in Schmid recognized these changing federal precedents as well as the many
dissenting and concurring opinions within this line of cases. Among the more obvious of these is
that of Justice Black, the author of Marsh, who wrote a strong dissenting opinion in Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968).
Similarly, Justice Powell's concurrence in Pruneyard, joined by Justice White, in which he said he
would limit the holding to the facts of that case, is a factor making application of this doctrine more
difficult. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 96 (1980).
234. See, e.g., Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 442 A.2d 471 (Conn. 1982); People v. Diguida,
576 N.E.2d 126 (I11. Ct. App. 1991), overruled by 604 N.E.2d 336 (111. 1992); City of Jamestown
v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1991) (ho!ding restriction on speech of abortion protesters
outside a physician's office at a city-owned shopping mall violated the First Amendment); Ferner
v. Toledo Lucas County Convention and Visitors Bureau, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 1158 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992); Jacobs v. Major, 390 N.W.2d 86 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), overruled in par 407 N.W.2d 832
(Wis. 1987).
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